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THE BARBER AND THE BOARD:
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF
ADMiNISTRATIVE REGULATION
OF A STUDENT'S HAIRSTYLE
I.

INTRODUCTiON AND BACKGROUND

Concern with the length of hair is no longer limited to Broadway plays near insolvent barbers. Although federal district
courts have recently been deluged with suits having as their purpose the implementation of total desegregation, these courts
have been called upon frequently to determine the comparative
rights of students and public school administrative bodies in
the area of personal grooming. In 1969, there were at least nine
cases in federal courts contesting the authority of public schools,
at both the secondary and collegiate levels, to restrict the length
or manner in which male students wore their hair.1 The results
of these cases have created an increased awareness that the
issue is not so frivolous as it may appear at first glance 2 and
have produced a split of decisions which may ultimately call for
resolution by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Since most states have statutes which give broad powers to
superintendents and boards of education to "have charge of the
public schools . . . [and] make regulations as to attendance

therein,"8 state courts have had little trouble in upholding pub1. Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969) ; Brick
v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316 (D.Col. 1969) ; Calbillo v. San Jacinto
Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F.
Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969); Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D.
Mass. 1969), Crew v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969) ; Griffen v.
Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp.
1360 (N.D. Ala. 1969); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
2. Chief Judge Wyzanski stated in Richards v. Thursto, 304 F. Supp. 449
(D. Mass. 1969):
[Tihe issues here presented with respect to arbitrary official
orders as to hair style are serious in the eyes of a very large
proportion of our society (though perhaps the degree of concern
varies according to age levels) and that that serious concern
is not purely emotional. It has a rational core. And it is, quite
literally a fighting issue to some. To belittle the issue might
reveal judicial prejudice, not perceptiveness.
304 F. Supp. at 456.
3. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37 (Supp. 1969). Further, board of education in Massachusetts are given power to make "reasonable regulations ...
as to school matters as ... [they] shall from time to time prescribe." MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 76, § 5 (Supp. 1969).
In South Carolina, school trustees have the power to "[piromulgate rules
prescribing . . . standards of conduct and behavior that must be met by all
pupils as a condition to the right . . . to attend public schools .... " S.C.
CODE ANN., § 21-230 (Supp. 1969). This statute has been read as giving

validity to regulations regulating the length of hair. See 1965-66 Opz. Ar'V
GEN., No. 2051, p. 134.
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lic school regulations which require closely-shorn locks upon the

heads of students. In Leonard v. Committee of Attleboro,4 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a regulation
which prohibited "extreme haircuts or any items which are felt
to be detrimental to classroom decorum." 5 Although young
Leonard was an otherwise well-groomed, conscientious student
and although his success as a professional musician was to some
extent related to his long hair, the court stated:
We are of the opinion that the unusual hair style of the
plaintiff could disrupt and impede the maintenance of
a proper classroom atmosphere or decorum. This is an
aspect of personal appearance and hence akin to matters of dress. Thus, as with any unusual, immodest or
exaggerated mode of dress, conspicuous departures
from accepted customs in the matter of haircuts could
result in the distraction of other pupils. 6
This decision, of course, was based solely upon Massachusett's
construction of its school laws7 ; nevertheless, the powers of the
school committee were held to be superior to any rights which
a student might have in regard to the length of his hair. 8
Therefore, a school committee might anticipate that a particular
hairstyle or mode of dress would be disruptive, and regulations
calculated to dispel such disruption would be valid. 9 This view
has been accepted with little qualification in other state courts.10
Further impetus was given to the above view when, in Ferrell
v. Dallas Independent School District," the Fifth Circuit Court
4. 212 N.E.2d 468 (Mass. 1965), 14 A.L.R.3d 1192 (1967).
5. Id. at 470, 14 A.L.R.3d at 1195
6. Id. at 472, 14 A.L.R3d at 1198 (emphasis added).
7. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 71, § 37, ch. 76 § 5 (Supp. 1969).
8. Leonard had also argued that the requirement of short hair invaded
the privacy of his home and family life. The court summarily answered that
the "domain of the family must give way . . . [to] a regulation reasonably
calculated to maintain school discipline... ." Leonard v. Committee of Attleboro, 212 N.E.2d 468, 473 (Mass. 1965) 14 A.L.R.3d 1192, 1199 (1967).
9. The court intimated that the Committee's discretionary powers were so
broad that it could have concluded that only the strictest application of the
rule could insure success, regardless of detriment to plaintiff Leonard.
10. See, e.g., Akin v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr.
557 (1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 1041 (1969). (Restraint imposed upon high
school student's freedom to grow beard by district's policy requiring students
to be clean shaven was rationally and reasonably related to enhancement of
free public education). But see Meyers v. Arcata Union High School Dist.,
75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1968). (Dress code stating that "extremes" of hair styles
were not acceptable was unconstitutionally vague and unreasonable).
11. 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), affd 393 F.2d 697 (1968), cert.
den. 393 U.S. 856 (1968). (Note the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas.)
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of Appeals affirmed a Texas district court's determination that
a group of student musicians should be suspended until they
complied with a mandate of their principal that they cut their
hair.1 2 Assuming, without deciding, that an individual's hairstyle was a constitutionally protected mode of expression, the
district and circuit courts determined that the plaintiffs were
not denied substantive or procedural due process of law as provided by the fourteenth amendment. Noting that the students
had exhaustive administrative remedies which they had used,
the circuit court justified the principal's actions, saying:
The compelling reason for the state infringement with
which we deal is obvious. The interest of the state in
maintaining an effective and efficient school system is
of paramount importance. That which so interferes
[with] or hinders the state in providing the best education possible for its people must be eliminated or circumscribed as needed. This is true even when that
which is condemned is the exercise of a constitutionally
protected right.1 3
In concluding that the principal's order was reasonable, great
weight was given to the recitation of certain individuals concerning incidents which the plaintiffs' long hair incited. 14
Thus, at this stage, the budding rock performer could not wear
his hair with the abandon of a Mick Jagger, 5 nor could the
dapper young Fauntleroy' 8 sport his fashionable locks. 7

Yet

hope was in sight.'8
12. The action was brought under that section of the Civil Right Act of
1871 which reads in part as follows:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any state . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . to the deprivation
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Supp. 1969).
13. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 393 F.2d 697, 703 (1969).
14. The principal, for instance, said that the plaintiffs were often the
victims of obscene remarks and were frequently referred to the females' toilet
facility. Furthermore, plaintiffs made a recording which bemoaned, in song,
their plight. The sound track was played on local radio stations.
15. The lead vocalist of a notorious rock group, "The Rolling Stones."
16. The hero of a novel by Frances Hodgson Burnett, Little Lord Fauntleroy.
17. The circuit judge in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 393
F2d 697 (1968), suggested, apparently not in jest, that the plaintiffs wear
wigs while performing on stage. 392 F.2d at 704.
18. See Comment, 17 J. PuB. LAw 151 (1968).
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II. HAIR AND THE
iCONsTiTuTIoN-THE IhAcT or TiwHim
In February, 1968, with the Supreme Court of the United
States' decision in Tinker v. DesMoines Community School Dis9
trict,1
courts began to take a more objective view of tonsorial
matters. Although the Tinker Court specifically disavowed the
relevance of its decision to the hairstyle cases, 2 0 it broadly stated
the proposition that a student does not leave his constitutional
rights at the schoolhouse door.21 In relation to a student's
constitutional rights in general, the Court stated:
[W]here there is no finding and no showing that the
exercise of the forbidden right would "materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the
22
prohibition cannot be susta.ined.
In our society, therefore, constitutional rights may not be
abrogated merely because there is an apprehension that certain
behavior may lead to unpopular results. Such a proposition
seems to propound constitutional grounds for allowing students
23
to wear their hair at the length which they desire.
Courts are as yet not inclined to find that hirsute matters
constitute expression which so nearly approaches pure speech
that the full protection of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution should be given. 24 Concededly, hairstyle
is more a matter of one's personal preference than of one's
ideological beliefs. Yet, if a public institution promulgates a
rule which prohibits a certain hairstyle with the intention of
excluding certain individuals from that institution, then the
first amendment may invalidate the rule. 25 Generally, the
length and style of a student's hair is considered to be a symbolic expression of his individuality only, divorced from sym19. 393 U.S. 503 (1968).
20. The Court stated that "[t]he problem presented by the present case
[did] not relate to . . . hair styles or deportment. Compare Ferrell v. Dallas
Independent School District, 392 F2d 697 (1968) .....

21. Id. at 506.

Id. at 507-08.

22. Id. at 509.
23. Cf. Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 203 (1952). Both of these cases involved the attempts
of states to place unreasonable restrictions upon the teaching profession.
24. See, e.g., Crew v. Cloncs, 203 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
25. In Calbillo v.Sat Jacinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex.

1969), school officials determined that long hair and beards were the badges
of undesirables ("hippies"). Thus, they promulgated a rule designed to exclude such undesirables from their institution. This rule was held to be violative of the plaintiff's first amendment rights.
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bolic expression of his religious, political, economic, or moral
20

values which would be protected by the first amendment.
There can be little doubt that, if one's religious or political
beliefs required that he wear his hair at a certain length, the
first amendment would support his right to so wear his hair.
Nevertheless, the first amendment argument in support of long
hair in public schools has lost its appeal with the development
27
of other valid and more readily applicable federal standards.
A student's right to wear long hair is easily brought within
the fourteenth amendment. Procedural due process will rarely
be at issue since federal courts are not bound to wait for final
determinations by state administrative or judicial bodies before
reviewing a case.28 Although a board of education may still
make rules regulating the conduct and appearance of its students, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires such regulations be reasonable and explicit. 29 Therefore,
the requirement that a public school show that the regulation
prohibiting hair of a certain length must set a standard which
is necessary to insure that the goals for which the school is
created will be attained is more in line with modern constitutional development. In other words, school officials must
demonstrate affirmatively that long hair is in fact disruptive of
school procedures,3 0 or establish that such a standard or rule is
necessary to deal with activities which may materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline.3 1 Such a burden of proof of necessity or disruption
might be sustained by showing that the long hair would present difficult problems of health, sanitation, safety, or disci26. Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Col. 1969). But see

Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
27. As Chief Judge Wyzanski noted in Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp.
449 (D. Miss. 1969), state remedies are undesirable because they are not
attainable with enough speed to be reasonably effective. 304 F. Supp. at 455.

28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Supp. 1969).

29. Cf. Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Wieman v.

Updegraff, 344 U.S. 203 (1952). Previously, it was proposed that the right
to attend public schools was subject to any restrictions. The hypothesis has
yielded to the proposition that restrictions must be reasonable and necessary.
30. Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D.Minn. 1969). Contra Crew v.
Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969). One should note that at the
time of the Ferrell case, "Beatle" style hair cuts had been in vogue for some
three years. Furthermore, ten students from the school which expelled the
plaintiffs testified that such haircuts were "generally accepted."

Thus, doubt

is raised as to the disruptive nature of the plaintiffs' hairstyles. Ferrell v.
Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545, 552 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
31. Griffen v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Zachry v.
Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1969); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702
(W.D. Wis. 1969).
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pline 32 Nevertheless, regulation should be aimed at the reasonable solution of the problem, and the cutting of the student's
hair seems patently unreasonable. An example of a reasonable
solution or standard might be: if a student's long hair endangered or could endanger the safety of other students in a
chemistry lab, then the long-haired student should be required to
wear some device, such as a hair net, to alleviate the problem.3 3
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
speaks even more pertinently to the problem of the regulation
of hair length and styles in the schools. In Riohards v. Thurston, 34 Chief Judge Wyzanski noted that:
Whether hairstyles be regarded as evidence of conformity or of individuality, they are one of the most
visible examples of personality. This is what every
woman has always known. And so have many men,
without the aid of an anthropologist, behavioral scientist, psychiatrist, or practitioner of any of the fine arts
35
or black arts.
Since, in theory, women are constitutionally guaranteed rights
equal to those of men, the question should not be whether the
regulations apply equally to all males,3 6 but should be whether
the regulations apply equally to all students-male and female
alike. Any attempt to classify students with respect to appearance is a classification upon an unreasonable basis, in violation
of the equal protection clause. In Zachry v. Brow,87 the
Alabama district court used the equal protection clause to strike
down a haircut regulation since it was obvious that the school
administrators were personally indignant of people with long
hair. Although the court further stated that the administrators
could have prevailed by showing moral or social reasons for
their actions,3 8 the Zachry case demonstrates the applicability
of the equal protection clause. Extending that concept one step
32. Thus, a case such as Carr v. Dighton, 229 Mass. 304, 118 N.E. 525

(1918), may still be applicable. There, pupils were excluded from school
activities, because they had "head lice."
33. In Griffen v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969), the rule was

promulgated because boys were late to class because they were grooming
themselves. The court stated that a solution other than the requirement of
short hair must be found, 300 F. Supp. at 63. See also Westley v. Rossi, 305

F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969).
34. 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969).
35. Id. at 451.
36. This was a fallacy in Akin v. Board of Education, 262 Cal. App. 2d 161,
68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968).
37. 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
38. Accord, Crew v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
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farther and assuming that female students are permitted to
wear their hair in any manner or at any length they wish,
classification with respect to sex would seem to be classification
upon an unreasonable basis. More simply, there are no more
hazards in a male wearing his hair long than in a female doing
so. No court has spoken specifically to the issue of whether
restrictions of males' hair styles violate the equal protection
clause because women's are not restricted at all. One must admit
that the issue is relevant and valid, especially in light of recent
developments relating to discrimination because of sex.
A most appealing and most rational argument has been
developed by an analogy to Griswold v. Connetiaut.a9 In that
case, Justice Goldberg propounded in a concurring opinion the
theory that the Bill of Rights, as an entity, radiates a general
right of privacy which gives full force and effect to the protections therein. 40 Certainly this right of privacy or even the
Constitution itself leaves a great deal of room for a right of
individuality and personality. Furthermore, it follows that hair
is unique in this area. For example, if a girl wishes to wear an
extremely short skirt to her high school, the possibility of disruption is obvious. To require her to wear a longer skirt to
school is not per se unreasonable because she may wear a miniskirt anywhere she desires, except to school. The state's interest
in orderly school procedure is protected with a minimal infringement upon the rights of the young girl. Once a male
cuts his hair, however, he may not replace it. The requirement
that the male cut his hair not only affects his activities at
school, but will also affect his activities outside of school. The
school has imposed its desires upon the student by totally removing any right the student may have to express his individuality or personality by wearing his hair at a certain length.
Thus, any requirement that the male student cut his hair is
per se unreasonable unless the state demonstrates and proves
that there is a substantial necessity that he cut his hair. The
above formulation was rejected in Crew v. Gloncs4" by restricting Griswold to its facts. Grwold spoke to the privacy of
marriage-a fundamental and basic right of American society.
The Clonces court considered hairstyles as a choice of grooming,
not as a manifestation of one's individuality or personality.
39. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. Id. at 486.

41. 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind., 1969).
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Even in light of the above discussions, some courts still refuse
to review the constitutional aspects of hair length regulation
by the public schools on the theory that school officials and not
judges should run the schools or that any constitutional right
may be subjected to reasonable infringement. 4 2 Nevertheless,
the question is ripe for review by the Supreme Court of the
United States. District courts in six judicial circuits heard
cases on this issue in 1969. Of the nine reported cases dealing
with restrictions upon hairstyles by public school officials, five
held such restrictions unconstitutional on federal constitutional
grounds, four upheld the restrictions, mainly by skirting the
constitutional issues. 43 The general state of the law seems to be
that restrictions may be made upon the length of a student's
hair regardless of the constitutional right infringed upon. The
new element, injected by Tinker,44 seems to be the requirement
of a substantial showing by the school that the hairstyle is disruptive of school procedures or that the regulation is necessary
for the efficient operation of the school. This view takes more
cognizance of the rights of students and manifests a realization
that the high school classroom is the source of tomorrow's
citizens. As Justice Douglas, dissenting upon the denial of
certiorari in Ferrellwrote:
It comes as a surprize in a country where the States
are restrained by an Equal Protection Clause, a person
can be denied education in a public school because of
the length of his hair. I suppose that a nation bent on
turning out robots might insist that every male have
a crew cut and every female wear pigtails. But the
ideas of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,"
expressed in the Declaration of Independence, later
found specific definition in the Constitution itself, including of course freedom of expression and a wide
zone of privacy. I had supposed those guarantees permitted idiosyncracies to flourish, especially when they
concern the image of one's personality and his philoso45
phy toward government and his fellow men.

42. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Board of Education, 306 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ga.

1969).
43. Id.
44. Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1968).
45. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
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That the present Court would go so far as to adopt the above
is doubtful 46 ; however, adequate and less far-reaching grounds
are available which will protect the student's rights and the
school's interests.
JosEH T. MoEmvm

46. See 39 U.S.L.W. 3141 (Oct. 13, 1970). The Supreme Court there
,denied certiorari to a "hair" case very similar to those cited in this article;
Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (1970).
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